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FROM IMPERIAL CHINA TO CYBERSPACE:
CONTRACTING WITHOUT THE STATE
David D. Friedman, Ph.D.*
I. THE PAST AS PROLOGUE
In 1895, as part of the treaty of Shimonoseki, China ceded the island
of Taiwan to Japan. The Japanese government wished to maintain the ex-
isting legal system; in order to do so it had to discover what that legal sys-
tem was. A scholarly commission was established, and its report provides
us with a detailed picture of the legal system of at least one province of
Imperial China at the end of its last dynasty (Brockman 1980, p. 130).1
One feature of that legal system was the combination of elaborate con-
tractual practice with an almost total absence of contract law. Imperial
China had no equivalent of our civil lawsuits. A merchant who had sold
goods on credit and not been paid could, if he wished, report his debtor to
the district magistrate for the crime of swindling him-but once he had
done so, the case was out of the merchant's hands. The magistrate, if con-
vinced of the justice of the claim, might compel repayment-usually only
partial repayment. He might do nothing. He might even conclude that the
merchant was the one at fault and sentence him to a beating. The legal sys-
tem enforced by the magistrate focused almost entirely on criminal acts and
criminal punishment, with only a handful of provisions dealing with matters
of contract (Brockman 1980, p. 85),2 and some, such as the statute specify-
ing a maximum interest rate, appear to have been ignored in practice.
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University. I would like to thank Bruce Benson for permitting
me to read a manuscript of his which makes some of the same argument as this article from a somewhat
different perspective. I have felt free to avail myself of his references where they were relevant to my
argument, and have included a number of relevant articles by Benson in the list of references at the end
of this piece. An earlier version of part of this chapter was published in the Journal of Internet Law
(Friedman 2002).
1 "The major publication in the area of customary law was Taiwan Shiho [the Private Law of
Taiwan] (1910), a six-volume work which reprinted and analyzed documents pertaining to land law,
family law, personal property and commercial law ... with seven volumes of reference materials .... "
2 "Of the 346 statutes in the Code, only eight dealt at all with what is usually called commercial
law."
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The Chinese empire relied heavily on non-state hierarchical structures
to maintain order and settle disputes, most notably the extended family, and
it supported them in doing so (Bodde and Morris 1967). That provided a
possible mechanism for settling contract disputes within family, clan or
guild. But merchants in Taiwan engaged in extensive large scale dealings
that cut across all such categories, buying bulk agricultural products to ship
across the straits to be sold in the mainland, importing mainland products to
Taiwan, and much else.
The problem of settling commercial disputes without state courts was
dealt with in medieval Europe, in part, by the development of private courts
at the major trade fairs, run by merchants and relying heavily on reputa-
tional enforcement (Benson 1998c). No equivalent seems to have devel-
oped in China, perhaps due to Imperial hostility to any rival authority.
Nonetheless, Chinese merchants developed an elaborate set of contrac-
tual forms, including a variety of form contracts, supporting an extensive
and sophisticated network of commercial relations. Part of the explanation
of how they did so was presumably the existence of reputational enforce-
ment, part the availability of state courts for dealing, when all else failed,
with parties engaged in deliberate and obvious violations. But much of the
explanation lies in the details of the private contract law that developed
within that framework-a system of rules designed to minimize the reliance
on courts and external enforcement.
One example is the rule that we call caveat emptor. Under any cir-
cumstances short of clear and deliberate fraud-gold bars that turned out to
be gold plated lead, for example-a merchant who had accepted delivery of
goods had no recourse if they turned out to be defective. Another is the
linkage between possession, ownership, and responsibility; goods in my
warehouse were mine, whether or not they were about to become yours, and
I bore the risk of any damage that occurred to them.3 The rules appear to
have been designed, wherever practical, to let a loss lie where it fell, thus
eliminating the need for legal action to shift it.
Problems arise in situations where canceling a contract and leaving
everything in the possession of whoever, at the moment, has it will advan-
tage one party, a situation that encourages opportunistic breach. One solu-
tion is to redesign the contract so that the two parties' performance is more
nearly synchronized, reducing the incentive of either to breach. An alterna-
tive is to rely on reputational enforcement, structuring the contract so that
the incentive to breach, if it occurs, is likely to be on the party who will
suffer reputational penalties from breaching.
An example in the Chinese case is provided by contracts for future
purchase of commodities at a pre-arranged price. Such contracts were not
considered binding until there had been at least partial performance by one
3 There were a few exceptions-most notably for a dye shop that would have cloth in it to be
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party. Typically, that consisted of a deposit paid in advance by the pur-
chaser. By adjusting the size of the deposit, the parties could take account
of both how large the incentive of the seller to breach might become-
depending on the range of likely price changes between contract formation
and delivery-and how much each party was constrained to keep to the deal
by reputation.
A buyer who breached forfeited his deposit-a result that required no
judicial intervention, since the deposit was in the possession of the seller.
That left an obvious problem-a seller who breached but kept the deposit.
Presumably that was prevented by some combination of reputation and the
threat that such an obviously criminal act would provide the buyer suffi-
cient grounds for going to court.
Important elements in making the system work were the existence of a
system of written forms using standard boilerplate terminology understood
by the parties and others in the trade, and the use of seals-"chops"-to
provide clear evidence of assent to a contract. So long as issues of fact
were simple-whether a shipment of grain had been delivered and ac-
cepted, but not the precise quality or quantity-it was possible for third
parties to determine, at a low cost, which party to a contract had violated its
terms. Here the third party might be either another merchant interested in
knowing who could be trusted or, in extreme cases, a district magistrate
interested in who had committed a criminal offense and should be punished
accordingly.
Whatever the mechanisms responsible-interested readers can find a
more detailed account in Brockman's chapter--Chinese merchants a cen-
tury ago succeeded in maintaining a sophisticated system of contracts with
very nearly no use of state enforcement. It is the thesis of this paper that
the past of China is our future-that parties to online transactions will, over
the next few decades, face essentially the same problem and find, mutatis
mutandis, similar solutions.
Both the Chinese past and the cyberspace future are special cases of a
more general problem--contract enforcement in the absence of state en-
forced contract law. That problem appears in a variety of other contexts,
including criminal markets and political markets. Perhaps less obviously, it
appears in markets where court enforcement, although legally possible, is
impractical because performance is difficult or impossible to monitor. The
marriage market is an important example. For instance ....
Al-Tannuhki, a 10h century judge, tells the story of a vizier who gave
a large sum in alms, 200 dinar, to a poor woman. Three days later he re-
ceived a petition from the woman's husband, reporting that she had decided
she was now too rich to be married to a poor man like him and was threat-
ening to force him to divorce her. The husband asked the vizier to appoint
some man in authority to prevent his wife from doing so. The vizier con-
sidered the problem briefly, took out paper and pen, and wrote "pay this
man 200 dinar" (Margoliouth 1922).
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It is possible for state courts to enforce rules permitting or restricting
divorce. It is a great deal harder for them to enforce the other terms, ex-
plicit or implicit, of the marriage contract-to sanction someone for not
doing a good job of being a wife or husband, even if the failure is deliber-
ate. Given that difficulty, legal rules designed to punish one party for ex-
plicitly breaching the contract by getting a divorce may merely give that
party an incentive to breach the less observable terms of the contract in
order to make it in the other party's interest to agree to terminate it. That
problem appears to have existed even in a medieval society whose marriage
law was, on the face of it, heavily biased in favor of the husband.
Part II of the paper presents a general approach to private contract en-
forcement, some features of which are illustrated in the Chinese example.
Part HI sketches out the reasons why I expect that, for transactions in cyber-
space, state enforcement of contracts will work worse and reputational en-
forcement better than in realspace today, including the technologies that
provide an online equivalent of the seals used by Chinese merchants to es-
tablish the identity of a signatory party at a distance, in time or space. I go
on to discuss how, in that environment, parties might structure their deal-
ings, as well as the difficulties they will face due to the special nature of the
cyberspace environment.
II. ENFORCING CONTRACTS WITHOUT THE STATE
Two parties wish to form a contract in a context where enforcement
through a state court system is not a practical option. One simple way of
doing so is the silent auction, for which we have descriptions going back to
the sixth century B.C.4 One party piles up the goods he wishes to sell, the
other makes a matching pile of what he offers in exchange. If the offer is
acceptable, the first party takes the second pile and leaves the first, and if
not, the first party adjusts his offer. The process continues until one party
accepts the other's most recent offer.
No common language is required for this simplest form of auction, but
the parties still need some way of enforcing their property rights, of pre-
venting one of them from taking both piles and departing. That might be
either the threat of violence or the discipline of repeated dealings-the ex-
pectation that if one party acted that way this year, the other would not
show up next year.
Difficulties arise when what the parties are contracting for is perform-
ance, by one or both, spread out over a period of time. Lloyd Cohen has
discussed that problem in the context of modem marriage law, where the
combination of a shift to no fault divorce and a pattern of traditional mar-
riage within which the wife's performance of her part of the joint duties
4 By Cosmas Indicopleustes and in the fifth century B.C. by Herodotus.
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was concentrated in the early years of the marriage, the husband's more
heavily weighted towards the later years, provided an incentive for oppor-
tunistic breach by the husband (Cohen 1987).
A partial solution in that case was for the wife to postpone childbear-
ing and shift part of the cost of child rearing from household to market, thus
aligning her performance more closely with the husband's. In a less inti-
mate context, contractors building a house expect to receive payments
spaced out over the time of construction and at least roughly corresponding
to the spacing of costs, reducing the incentive of a contractor paid in ad-
vance to skip out with the money or a home owner promising to pay on
completion to renege.
This kind of solution works reasonably well as long as the joint gains
from final completion of the contract are substantial relative to the costs.
Consider, however, the limiting case in the other direction-a situation
where the gain to one party from breach is just equal to the loss to the other.
In such a situation, any departure from perfectly synchronized per-
formance gives one party or the other an incentive to breach. If I have paid
the contractor a little more than he has spent so far, he has an incentive to
breach; if I have paid him a little less, I do. A more realistic example, and
one which seems to have been a serious issue in the Chinese case, is a con-
tract for future delivery at a pre-agreed price. If the transaction cost of ar-
ranging a replacement supplier is low, any significant drop in price provides
an incentive for the buyer to breach; if the costs of finding a replacement
buyer is low, any significant increase provides an incentive for the seller to
breach. The parties can guard against breach by the buyer by having him
pay a deposit in advance, but that increases the incentive for breach by the
seller.
One solution is to create an artificial gain from completion-a cost to
breach-by making it possible for the victim of breach to unilaterally im-
pose a large cost on the other but not a correspondingly large benefit on
himself. The deposit is replaced by a hostage. The threat of destroying the
hostage reduces the gain to breach by the party who has given the hostage
without creating a proportional increase in the gain to breach by the party
holding the hostage. The logic of the situation is illustrated by Figures la-
ic.
Figure la shows the situation with neither deposit nor hostage. The
horizontal axis is time, starting just after the contract is negotiated. The
vertical axis shows, for each party, its gain to breach-how much better off
it will be if it breaches at that time than if the contract is completed. At
time zero, the parties have negotiated the contract but no performance has
occurred and no deposit has been made. Assuming that there was some
cost to negotiation, which the parties expected to at least recover on com-
pletion of the contract, both parties should be worse off breaching at that
point than carrying the contract to completion.
2005]
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Over time, each party bears costs of performance which it expects to
recover on completion, pushing the gain from breach further down, as
shown between t=O and t=10. At some point, possibly before completion,
each party starts to get benefits from the partial performance that has oc-
curred, increasing the gain (i.e. reducing the loss) from breach. In the fig-
ure, Party 1 is continuing to bear costs of performance from t=10 to t=20.
Party 2 is no longer bearing costs of performance but is receiving benefits.
So the gain to breach is falling for Party 1 but rising for Party 2.
If the contract is badly designed, at some point Party l's benefit to
breach rises above zero. In a world with no enforcement of contracts, legal
or reputational, Party 1 breaches-perhaps immediately, perhaps with a
delay to let the gain rise even higher. In the Figure, that happens at t=20.
Party l's gain is smaller than Party 2's loss, so the breach is inefficient.
The parties can try to avoid such an outcome in the initial agreement
by having Party 1 make payments to Party 2 between t=10 and t=20, shift-
ing some of the gain from breach and keeping both parties' gain from
breach negative. But in an uncertain and imperfectly observable world, this
may not always work, since the parties do not know with certainty what the
pattern of either performance costs or benefits will be.
Figure lb shows the same contract, with one change-at t=O, Party 1
pays a deposit d to Party 2. That shifts Party l's gain from breach down,
since if the contract does not go to completion the deposit will remain with
Party 2; it is now no longer in Party l's interest to breach the contract. Un-
fortunately, it also shifts Party 2's gain from breach up, since Party 2 can
breach and keep the deposit. The result is that it is now in the interest of
Party 2 to breach the contract-in this example, immediately after signing it
and receiving the deposit.'
Figure Ic shows the same contract again, this time with Party 1 giving
Party 2 a hostage rather than a deposit. The result is to shift Party l's gain
from breach down without shifting Party 2's gain from breach up, so nei-
ther party has an incentive to breach the contract.
Gain from Figure 1 a
Breach
5 The situation without the deposit or hostage is shown by the grey lines on figures lb and ic.
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One example of this approach is the literal hostage, offered by one
party in a conflict as a guarantee that he will abide by terms agreed to. For
a less obvious equivalent, consider the role of the state court system in Tai-
wan. If a merchant failed to either deliver the goods contracted for or re-
turn the buyer's deposit, the buyer could report him to the district magis-
trate as a swindler. The resulting legal case might or might not provide any
benefit to the buyer but was likely to impose large costs on the seller. From
the standpoint of the strategic situation of the two parties, the threat to make
use of the court served the same function as the threat to execute a hostage.
A similar situation arises in a world without courts, but in which par-
ties are concerned about their reputation. When you cheat me, I gain very
little by making the fact public. But, assuming my report is credible, you
lose a great deal. That fact, combined with a credible commitment on my
part to report breach, increases the net cost of breach and so reduces the risk
Gain from Figure lb
Breach
Gain from Figure 1c
Breach
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that breaching will be in the interest of one of the parties.6 Both this case
and the previous have an additional attractive feature: the existence of the
hostage depends at least in part on the existence of breach, since the accusa-
tion of breach, whether to the court or to the general public, is more damag-
ing if true.
For a final example, consider the enforcement of contractual agree-
ments in modem criminal markets. Antonio pays Ricco $100,000 for a
large container of what turns out to be talcum powder. Antonio pays a hit
man an additional $10,000 to kill Ricco-after first prudently convincing
the local capo of the justice of his case in order not to get a reputation as a
dangerous man to do business with but only a dangerous man to cheat.
Here Ricco is, in effect, hostage for his performance-and Antonio for his.
It may occur to readers familiar with Coase that there is a problem
with the use of hostages as a solution to the problem of opportunistic
breach. The son I give as a hostage may be of no value to you, but he is of
considerable value to me. If you decide to breach our agreement, you also
inform me that you will kill him unless I buy him back from you for a suit-
able price. Similarly, if we are merchants in Taiwan, you breach the con-
tract and then offer to buy my silence. You thus convert the hostage back
into a deposit, eliminating the wedge between the terms on which it pays
me to breach and the terms on which it pays you to.
Nonetheless we observe the use of hostages in contexts where a de-
posit would be of little use. One explanation is that parties who wish to
give hostages are able to commit themselves not to accept such offers. An-
other is that the situation sets up a bilateral monopoly bargain with a large
bargaining range and such bargains are likely to generate substantial trans-
action costs. That said, the issue deserves further thought.7
The discussion of hostages brings us to the last and, for this purposes
of this paper, most interesting mechanism for enforcing contracts without
the state-reputation.
Reputational Enforcement
For a simple example of reputational enforcement, consider a depart-
ment store that guarantees to refund your money if you are not satisfied. If,
when you discover that the jacket you bought is the wrong size and your
6 This point was suggested to me by R.C. Friedman.
7 This problem parallels a similar issue in the use of inefficient punishments, such as imprison-
ment, in criminal law as a way of reducing the risk of setting off a rent seeking struggle as some people
attempt to use control of the criminal law to expropriate others. Thus we sometimes observe an ineffi-
cient punishment converted into a less inefficient punishment when police or prosecutors let one crimi-
nal off in exchange for testimony (true or false) that will allow them to convict another (Friedman
1999).
[VOL. 1:2
HeinOnline -- 1 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 356 2005
FROM IMPERIAL CHINA TO CYBERSPACE
wife points out that purple is not really your color, the store refuses to give
you a refund, you are unlikely to sue them-the amount at stake is not
enough to make it worth the time and trouble. Nonetheless, almost all
stores in that situation will, at least in my experience, take the product
back-because they want the reputation, with you and with other people
you may discuss the incident with, of living up to their promises.
For a more elaborate example, consider the New York diamond indus-
try, as described in a classic article by Lisa Bernstein (Bernstein 1992). At
one point, somewhat before the time she studied it, the industry had been
mostly in the hands of orthodox Jews, forbidden by their religious beliefs
from suing each other. They settled disputes instead by a system of trusted
arbitrators and reputational sanctions. If one party to a dispute refused to
accept the arbitrator's verdict, the information would be rapidly spread
through the community, with the result that he would no longer be able to
function in that industry. The system of reputational enforcement survived
even after membership in the industry became more diverse, with organiza-
tions such as the New York Diamond Dealer's Club providing both trusted
arbitration and information spreading.
The reason the department store, or the dishonest diamond merchant,
is concerned about his reputation is not fear of being disliked but of losing
business. The reason your friend will shop at another store if you tell him
that this one refused to take your jacket back is not that he wishes to punish
the store for cheating you but that he does not himself want to be cheated.
Reputational enforcement works by spreading true information about bad
behavior, information that makes it in the interest of some who receive it to
modify their actions in a way which imposes costs on the person who has
behaved badly.
How well that works depends on two things. One is the degree to
which reputation matters; if I am a confidence man who plans to cheat you
out of a million dollars and then retire, my future reputation is not very im-
portant. I don't care if anyone trusts me again. But most firms are in busi-
ness for more than one transaction. Hence, for most firms, a reputation for
cheating those they do business with is a costly liability.
The other critical variable is the cost to third parties of obtaining reli-
able information about what happened. In most disputes, both parties claim
that they are in the right and the other in the wrong. When I tell my friend
how badly the department store treated me he, hopefully, knows me well
enough to decide whether or not to believe my story. But when I read a
post on Usenet, a very large collection of online conversations, I do not
have that sort of information about the author. I have to form my opinion
based on internal evidence-does the poster sound reasonable-and consis-
tency with other sources of information, such as other people posting in
response.
If I claim that you cheated me, and you claim that I cheated you, a
third party who cannot easily find out which of us is telling the truth is
2005]
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likely to attribute some probability to both stories-and avoid doing busi-
ness with either of us in the future. It follows that if you have cheated me,
but I cannot easily demonstrate the fact to an interested third party, I may
be better off saying nothing, since complaining will lower my reputation as
well as yours. This raises a serious problem of incentive compatibility for a
system which depends on action taken, not by government employees hired
to enforce the law, but by private individuals acting in their own self inter-
est.8
One way of lowering information costs to third parties is to have a le-
gal system where the obligations of the parties depend on easily observed
facts-loosely speaking, a system of bright line rules rather than standards.
That appears to describe some features of the Chinese system already dis-
cussed.
For controversies with substantial amounts at stake, arbitration 9 pro-
vides a second mechanism for lowering information costs to interested third
parties. A New York diamond merchant does not have to know the details
of a controversy-merely the verdict of the arbitrator as to who was at fault
and whether or not the party at fault provided suitable compensation to the
injured party. That system works because, even if the interested third party
does not know the details of the controversy, he does know that the arbitra-
tor is competent and honest. As we will see, computer technology provides
an equivalent that requires considerably less information and functions at
even lower cost.
Cheating on the Reputational Bond
There is another problem, however, which is likely to be more serious
for online commerce than for the traditional realspace version. My current
reputation functions as a bond to guarantee performance-if I cheat on a
contract, I lose (or reduce) the reputation, which is costly. It follows that I
will not cheat unless the gain from doing so is more than the value of the
forfeited bond. If my reputation is worth a million dollars to me, you
should be safe in trusting me up to that sum-in, for example, lending me
$600,000.
I borrow $600,000 from you. I also borrow $400,000 from another
lender and $500,000 each from two more. I then default on all the loans,
forfeiting my million dollar reputation-in exchange for $2,000,000.
8 Friedman (2002), on which this article is in part based, includes a simple model of reputational
enforcement showing the link between cost to third parties and the amount of cheating.
9 Some readers may associate arbitration primarily with institutions for settling disputes that are
selected only after the dispute arises. In this article, my primary interest is in arbitrators chosen in
advance-by parties when they sign a contract that might lead to future disputes.
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In order for reputational enforcement to work, the party who relies on
it must have some way of knowing not only what opportunities the other
party has to cheat him but what opportunities he has to simultaneously
cheat other people. That may not be too much of a problem in the sort of
ordinary market where most of the players know each other-before agree-
ing to lend me $600,000 you first discuss the situation with other potential
lenders. But it could be a very serious problem for anonymous dealings
online in a worldwide marketplace. In order for reputational enforcement
to work in that setting, we need either an environment where the sort of
opportunities made possible by my particular reputation are scarce enough
so that I am unlikely to have a chance to take many at once, or procedures
sufficiently transparent so that someone who relies on my reputation can
know how many other people are currently doing so-how far I am stretch-
ing my reputational bond.
Whose Reputation?
A contract involves at least two parties, but they do not both have to
have reputations. One is normally enough, since the parties can usually
structure the contract to put the risk of breach on whichever can best bear it.
If you are performing a service for me and I trust you but you do not trust
me, because you are a repeat player with a reputation and I am not, I pay in
advance. Reverse the situation and I pay on completion. In ordinary com-
merce, individual purchasers pay for goods when they get them, in the ex-
pectation that if the computer in the box turns out to have no innards, the
store will take it back. The seller, in almost any field, is a repeat player
with a reputation-the buyer often is not.
What about the situation where neither player has a reputation? In that
case, they can solve the problem by bringing in a third party who does. An
escrow agency provides a familiar example. I agree to pay you $50,000 for
a sixteenth century painting by a known artist which you are offering on
eBay. You deliver the painting to an escrow agency. I inspect it. If it fits
the description I send you the money and claim the painting, if it does not
the agency sends it back to you. Neither of us has to trust each other-only
the agency. The mechanism does not depend on the existence of state
courts to enforce the agreement, only on a third party with an adequate
reputation.
III. PROBLEMS WITH PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT IN CYBERSPACE
Commercial activity in cyberspace, mostly on the World Wide Web, is
increasing rapidly. Such commerce poses two rather different problems for
conventional mechanisms of public contract enforcement. One, already
important, is that cyberspace has no geographical boundaries. Purchasing
20051
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goods or services from the other side of the world is as easy as purchasing
them from your next door neighbor. Delivery of physical goods is more
costly from the other side of the world-but some cyberspace commerce is
in information goods and services, and they can be delivered online just as
they can be purchased online. It follows that an increasing fraction of com-
mercial transactions, especially of transactions by private individuals, will
be between parties in different countries.
Public enforcement of contracts between parties in different countries
is more costly and uncertain than public enforcement within a single juris-
diction. Furthermore, in a world where geographical lines are invisible,
parties to publicly enforced contracts will frequently not know what law
those contracts are likely to fall under. Hence public enforcement, while
still possible for future online contracts, will be less workable than for the
realspace contracts of the past.
A second and perhaps more serious problem may arise in the future as
a result of technological developments that already exist and are now going
into common use. These technologies, largely based on public key encryp-
tion, make possible an online world where many people do business
anonymously, with reputations attached to their cyberspace, not their real-
space, identities (Friedman 1996).
There are a variety of reasons why people may in the future wish to
avail themselves of such technologies. One is privacy; many people do not
want others to know what they are reading, buying, or saying online.1" A
second is to evade taxes; it is hard for a government to collect taxes on ac-
tivities it cannot see. A third is to evade regulations, whether commercial
regulations in the U.S. or religious regulations in a country controlled by
Muslim fundamentalists. Anonymity is likely to be particularly attractive
to people living in parts of the world where property rights are insecure,
making secrecy a valuable form of protection (Friedman 2004). If, for
these or other reasons, a significant amount of commerce becomes anony-
mous, public enforcement of contracts will become increasingly irrelevant.
It is hard to sue someone when you do not know who he is or what conti-
nent he lives on.
Private Enforcement of Contracts
What about the private alternative? At first glance, one might think
that the same changes that made public enforcement of contracts more dif-
ficult in cyberspace would make private enforcement not only difficult but
impossible. My local department store keeps its promises in part because if
I am dissatisfied with their behavior, the people I talk to are likely to also be
10 For a discussion both of the puzzle of why people favor more privacy, for others as well as
themselves, and of the relation between privacy and technology, see Friedman (2000).
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their customers; in a future without geography, where everyone is shopping
everywhere, that is far less likely. And it is not obvious how you can injure
someone's reputation without knowing his name.
Both of these problems are soluble; in each case, online commerce
provides not merely substitutes for the reputational mechanisms with which
we are already familiar, but superior substitutes.
Consider first the problem of getting information from one customer to
another. Considered as a mechanism for spreading information, local gos-
sip is very much inferior to a well designed search engine. If, today, I am
considering dealing with an online merchant and want to know whether
other customers have had problems with him, I do not bother to ask either
friends or the Better Business Bureau. A one minute search with Google
will tell me whether anyone on Usenet News has mentioned that firm any
time in the past year, and show me what was said.
Online commerce is already institutionalizing such mechanisms. Con-
sider eBay. Their software permits anyone who has won an auction to post
comments on the seller-whether the goods lived up to their description,
were delivered promptly, or whatever else he wants to say. The comments
are available, both in summary form and in text, to anyone bidding in an
auction with that seller.
So far I have been considering informal reputational enforcement, the
online equivalent of the reputational mechanism that keeps your local de-
partment store honest. What about formal enforcement, along the lines of
the diamond industry, as described by Bernstein (Bernstein 1992)? Here
too, cyberspace has significant advantages over realspace.
Keys and Signatures: A Brief Digression
To explain how the cyberspace equivalents of arbitration by the Dia-
mond Dealer Club of New York and verification by the use of seals in 19
h
century China work, I must first briefly sketch some relevant technology;
readers already familiar with public key encryption and digital signatures
may want to skip this section.
Public key encryption is a mathematical process for scrambling and
unscrambling messages. It uses two keys, numbers containing information
about a particular way of scrambling a message. The special feature of
public key encryption is that if one of the two related numbers is used in the
scrambling process, the other must be used in the unscrambling process. If
I have one of the two keys I can encrypt my messages with that key, but
someone who wishes to decrypt messages that have been encrypted with
that key needs to use the other one. While the pair of keys is generated
together, there is no easy way of calculating one of the two keys from the
other.
To make use of public key encryption, one generates such a pair of
keys. One, called your public key, you make available to anyone you might
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be corresponding with. The other, called your private key, you keep en-
tirely secret.
Someone who wants to send you a message encrypts it using your
public key; since only you have the matching private key, only you can
decrypt it. Someone who wants to digitally sign a message encrypts it us-
ing his private key" and attaches unencrypted information identifying him-
self. The recipient obtains the sender's public key and uses it to decrypt the
message. The fact that what he gets is a message and not gibberish demon-
strates that it was encrypted with the matching private key; since only the
sender possesses that particular private key, the digital signature authenti-
cates the message. Thus the digital signature in cyberspace serves the same
function as the physical seal used to authenticate contracts in China a cen-
tury ago-to prove authorship and responsibility at a distance in space or
time.
Not only does a digital signature prove who sent the signed message, it
also proves that the message has not been altered, and it proves both in a
form that the sender cannot deny. If the sender tries to deny the message,
the recipient can point out that he has a version of it encrypted with the
sender's private key, something that only the sender could have produced.
Convincing Interested Third Parties
Imagine that you and I are signing a contract online, specifying our
mutual rights and obligations for some substantial transaction. We include
in the contract the name and public key of the arbitrator who we agree will
settle disputes between us. We then both digitally sign the contract. Each
of us gets a copy.
A dispute arises; I accuse you of violating the terms of the contract.
We put the question to the arbitrator. He rules in my favor and instructs
you to pay me $5000 in damages. You refuse. He writes up his account of
what happened (he ruled in my favor and you refused to abide by his rul-
ing), digitally signs it, and gives me a copy.
I now make up a package consisting of the original contract (digitally
signed by both of us, and including the arbitrator's public key) and the arbi-
trator's account (digitally signed by him). I send the package to any third
party who I think might want to know whether or not you are trustworthy-
and post it on a web page with your name all over it, to be found by anyone
11 The process used for digital signatures in the real world is somewhat more elaborate than this,
but the differences are not important for the purposes of this article. A digital signature is produced by
using a hash function to generate a message digest-a string of numbers much shorter than the message
it is derived from-and then encrypting the message digest with the sender's private key. The process is
much faster than encrypting the entire message and almost as secure. It also means that it is possible to
read the message without bothering to check the signature.
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searching for information about you. The third party (more precisely, his
computer) checks the digital signatures on the contract and on the account,
using the public key included in the contract to check that the account is by
the arbitrator we agreed to. The third party now knows that you agreed to
accept the ruling of that arbitrator and reneged on that agreement-and
finding that out has taken him essentially no time at all.
Digital signatures provide a way of drastically reducing the cost to in-
terested third parties of discovering whether someone is trustworthy.12 By
doing so, they increase the cost to individuals or firms engaged in repeat
transactions of reneging on their contractual agreements.
Private enforcement of contracts along these lines solves the problems
raised by the fact that cyberspace spans many geographical jurisdictions.
The relevant law is defined not by the jurisdiction but by the private arbitra-
tor chosen by the parties. Over time, we would expect one or more bodies
of legal rules with regard to contract to develop, with many different arbi-
trators or arbitration firms adopting the same or similar legal rules. 3 Con-
tracting parties could then choose arbitrators on the basis of reputation.
For small scale transactions, you simply provide your browser with a
list of acceptable arbitration firms; when you contract with another party,
the software picks an arbitrator from the intersection of the two lists. If
there exists no arbitrator acceptable to both parties, the software notifies
both of you of the problem and you take it from there.
Private enforcement also solves the problem of enforcing contracts
when at least one of the parties is, and wishes to remain, anonymous. Digi-
tal signatures make it possible to combine anonymity with reputation. A
computer programmer living in Russia or Iraq and selling his services
online has an online identity defined by his public key; any message signed
by that public key is from him. That identity has a reputation, developed
through past online transactions; the more times the programmer has dem-
onstrated himself to be honest and competent, the more willing people who
want programming done will be to employ him. The reputation is valuable,
so the programmer has an incentive to maintain it-by keeping his con-
tracts.14
12 Strictly speaking, what the third party learns is that the accused either is not trustworthy or has
agreed to use a dishonest or incompetent arbitrator. The latter alternative implies that while the accused
may not be dishonest, save in the very limited sense of refusing to be bound by his own mistake, he is
incompetent.
13 As Bruce Benson has pointed out, this development is closely analogous to the development of
the Lex Mercantoria in the early Middle Ages. That too was a system of private law enforced by reputa-
tional penalties, in an environment where state law was inadequate for contract enforcement, due in part
to legal diversity across jurisdictions (Benson 1998b,c).
14 The first discussion of privacy through anonymity online of which I am aware of was in a work
of fiction by a computer science professor, Verner Vinge's novelette "True Names." A good recent
description of the combination of anonymity with online reputation occurs early in Marc Siegler's novel
Earthweb.
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Cheating in a Reputational System 5
There are, unfortunately, ways in which the online world I have been
describing makes contract enforcement harder than in the real world. One
is that, in the real world, my identity is tied to a particular physical body,
identifiable by face, finger prints, and the like. I do not have the option,
after destroying my realspace reputation for honesty, of spinning off a new
me, complete with new face, new fingerprints, and an unblemished reputa-
tion.
Online, I do have that option. As long as other people are willing to
deal with cyberspace personae not linked to realspace identities, I always
have the option of rolling up a new public key/private key pair and going
online with a new identity and a clean reputation.
The implication is not that reputational enforcement will not work but
that it will only work for people who have reputations-sufficient reputa-
tional capital so that abandoning the current online persona and its reputa-
tion is costly enough to outweigh the gain from a single act of cheating.
Someone who wants to deal anonymously in a trust intensive industry may
have to start small, building up his reputation to the point where its value is
sufficient to make it rational to trust him with larger transactions. Pre-
sumably the same thing happens in the diamond industry today. 6
The problem of spinning off new identities is not limited to cyber-
space. Real persons in realspace have fingerprints but legal persons may
not. The realspace equivalent of rolling up a new pair of keys is filing a
new set of incorporation papers. There is a well developed literature on the
result, explaining marble facing for bank buildings and expensive advertis-
ing campaigns as ways of posting a reputational bond that makes it in a
corporation's interest to remain in business and hence gives others a reason
to trust it to act in a way that will preserve its reputation (Nelson 1974; Wil-
liamson 1983; Klein and Leffler 1981). Cyberspace personae do not have
the option of marble, at least if they want to remain anonymous, but they do
have the option of investing in a long series of transactions, or advertising,
15 A firm that breaches a contract but pays damages according to the terms specified in the con-
tract has not cheated in the sense in which I am using the terms. To cheat, it must both breach the con-
tract and fail to pay any damages agreed on in advance or awarded by a pre-agreed upon arbitrator.
16 Earthweb contains an entertaining illustration of this point. A central character has maintained
two online personae, one for legal transactions, with a good reputation, and one for quasi-legal transac-
tions, such as purchases of stolen property, with a deliberately shady reputation. At one point in the
plot, his good persona is most of the way through a profitable honest transaction when it occurs to him
that it would be even more profitable if, having collected payment for his work, he failed, at the last
minute, to deliver. He rejects that option on the grounds that having a persona with a good reputation
has just given him the opportunity for a profitable transaction; if he destroys that reputation it will be
quite a while before he is able to get other such opportunities.
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or some other publicly visible expenditure, in order to bond future perform-
ance.
What if only one of the parties to an online contract is a repeat dealer
with a reputation? The solution, as in realspace, is to structure the contract
so that it is not in the other party's interest to breach it. The simplest exam-
ple is the purchase of goods or services. The party who does not have a
reputation performs first-pays in advance if he is the buyer, delivers in
advance of payment if he is the seller.
We are left with an obvious problem-how can a pair of entities nei-
ther of which is engaged in long term dealings guarantee contractual per-
formance in this world? One solution has already been mentioned-
piggyback on the reputation of another entity that is engaged in such deal-
ings.
I am, again, an anonymous online persona forming a contract which
may provide me an opportunity to benefit by defaulting on my contractual
obligations. This time, however, I have no reputation and no time in which
to build one. Instead I offer to post a performance bond with the arbitra-
tor-in anonymous digital currency, 7 assuming that I am seriously inter-
ested in protecting my own anonymity. The arbitrator is free to allocate all
or part of the bond to the other party as damages for breach.
This approach still depends on reputational enforcement, but this time
the reputation belongs to the arbitrator. If he steals bonds posted with him,
he is unlikely to stay in business very long. If I am worried about such pos-
sibilities, I can require the arbitrator to sign a contract specifying a second
and independent arbitrator to deal with any conflicts between me and the
first arbitrator. My signature to that agreement is worth very little, since it
is backed by no reputation-but the signature of the first arbitrator to a con-
tract binding him to accept the judgment of the second arbitrator is backed
by the first arbitrator's reputation. For a less extreme example of the same
approach, consider the current use of escrow agencies for transactions on
eBay.
As that final example suggests, it is possible to combine realspace and
cyberspace institutions, state and private enforcement mechanisms. If court
enforcement in realspace turns out to provide a more reliable mechanism
than reputational enforcement online, anonymous online parties can use
identifiable real space third parties as escrow agencies, arbitrators, and in
other contexts in which a trusted third party eliminates the need for trust
between the other parties to a transaction. If, on the other hand, courts
prove less reliable, realspace parties can make use of online reputational
mechanisms instead-as they now do.
As long as parties are identifiable in realspace, the state has the option
of imposing its own terms on them-an option some parties may wish to
17 For a discussion of how such currency would work, see Friedman and Macintosh (2001, 2003).
20051
HeinOnline -- 1 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 365 2005
JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLICY
avoid. But anonymous parties in cyberspace who wish to make use of a
trusted third party in realspace can choose which third party, and hence
which state, they wish to deal with. States will thus be constrained by com-
petition in their dealing with online personae, just as U.S. states are cur-
rently constrained in dealing with corporations.
One way of succeeding in that competition is to make it possible for
online parties to take advantage of realspace enforcement without revealing
their realspace identities. A possible approach would be for a state to rec-
ognize transfers of claims from cyberspace to realspace persons, validated
by the former's digital signature. So if anonymous X has a valid claim
against realspace Y, X sells the claim to realspace Z who prosecutes it-
without either Z or the court having to know X's realspace identity.
One problem with reputational enforcement online is that a party can
roll up additional identities. A second problem is that a party can conduct
multiple transactions, each invisible to those party to the others. As dis-
cussed earlier, that means that a party with a million dollar reputation might
put together a collection of transactions, each of which was not worth
cheating on (and forfeiting the reputation) but which together were.
One solution is to have a million dollar reputation and engage in thou-
sand dollar transactions in a context where one is unlikely to be able to run
as many as a thousand of them at once. In realspace that is often practical.
It may work less well in cyberspace, where the identity of the party behind
a reputation, including how many actual persons that party consists of, may
be unknown.
An alternative is for a party to deliberately create transparency in order
that everyone who contracts with him will be aware of the existence (but
not necessarily the identity) of everyone else currently contracting with
him.
I wish to create an online identity, post a reputational bond, and be
trusted. My identity consists not only of a public key but also of a transac-
tional protocol-a set of rules associated with that identity and its reputa-
tion, specifying how people are to deal with me. The protocol is designed
to enforce transparency.
For a simple example, let the protocol specify that all transactions be-
come binding only when posted to a particular web page, publicly accessi-
ble. That way, anyone transacting with me can see how many other trans-
actions I am engaged in and whatever relevant features of the transaction-
the size of a loan, say-are specified in the protocol.
Reputation: Version Two
In the discussion so far, "reputation" meant "reputation for fulfilling
your contracts." But there is another sort of reputation that is important in
realspace-a reputation for competence in the activity you are performing
for pay. When you hire a lawyer or a heart surgeon, it isn't enough to know
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that he is honest. That sort of reputation can also be established in cyber-
space-and there too, the special circumstances of cyberspace raise prob-
lems, but problems that have their parallel in realspace.
Suppose I claim to be an expert in predicting real world events that po-
tential customers wish predicted-the weather, the outcome of a particular
legal case, the performance of a stock. Just as in realspace, I can establish a
track record by making a series of correct predictions. There is, however, a
problem.
To see it, imagine that my claim is to be able to predict, with certainty,
the outcome of coin tosses-which many potential customers want pre-
dicted. Some people have that ability but, unfortunately, I do not. I pro-
ceed as follows:
1. I obtain a list of 10,000 potential customers.
2. I create 128 identities, each of which claims to be an expert predic-
tor of coin flips, and divide the potential customers among them.
3. The first time a flip is to be predicted, half my identities predict
heads, half predict tails. The coin is flipped and comes up heads. I scrap
all of the identities that predicted tails and remove their customers from my
current list-retaining their names and email addresses for future iterations
of my business plan.
4. I repeat the previous step six more times.
I now have one surviving identity with about forty customers. Each of
them has seen that identity predict a coin flip correctly seven times in a
row, an event that could happen by chance less than one time in a hundred.
Predicting coin flips is valuable, so each should be willing to pay a sizable
sum for the next prediction.
I have just described the cyberspace equivalent of the market for in-
vestment newsletters or mutual funds. The chief difference-leaving aside
the simplification of my coin flipping model-is that in my version the
multiple identities all belong to the same person, making the fraud a delib-
erate one. In the realspace case, the publishers of each investment newslet-
ter or the administrators of each mutual fund may actually believe that they
know what the market will do next-and, each time, about half of them are
right.
How might someone who really did know how to predict coin flips
distinguish himself from those who did not but who might attempt to simu-
late that ability as described? The obvious answer is again some form of
bond. When I first go into business making (public) predictions of coin
flips, I also donate $100 in e-cash to some popular charity that is willing to
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testify to the receipt of the money from my online identity. I then make
seven consecutive correct public predictions.
A hundred dollars is not very much money. But in order to follow the
business plan described in steps 1-4 above, I needed 128 identities-which,
at $100 per identity, gets expensive. Furthermore, in addition to selling my
prediction of flip number eight to paying customers, I also post it on my
web page-after the customers have gotten their bets down but five minutes
before the coin is flipped. After another ten correct calls, a potential cus-
tomer can calculate that either I know something, or I am fantastically
lucky, or I am the sole survivor of a collection of identities that cost some-
what over twelve million dollars to create. The generalization to someone
selling investment advice, legal advice or medical advice online is left as an
exercise for the reader.
CONCLUSION
If the arguments I have offered are correct, we can expect to see a sub-
stantial shift in the direction of reliance on private enforcement via reputa-
tional mechanisms online, with an associated development of private law.
To some degree, the same development can be expected in realspace as
well. Digital signatures lower information costs to interested third parties
whether the transactions being contracted over are occurring online or not.
And the existence of a body of trusted online arbitrators will make contract-
ing in advance for private arbitration more familiar and reliance on private
arbitration easier for realspace transactions as well as for cyberspace trans-
actions.
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